Case Study Summary- Cooney

I chose this case because it was so fascinating to me! Hurricane Ike will definitely go down in the history books, and was very interesting to research!

It’s no doubt that Hurricane Ike was a massive disaster. Ike is defined as a Cape Verde-type hurricane, which means that it was a tropical cyclone that that developed into a tropical storm within a good distance of the Cape Verde Islands. Next, the said tropical storm turns into full on hurricane before reaching the Caribbean. Hurricane Ike started near Africa and slowly progressed to Turks and Caicos, the Bahamas, Cuba, and then reaching its final destination, Galveston, TX. The track that Ike took was through the Gulf of Mexico, and ended up tearing through a solid part of Texas and Louisiana. Hurricane Ike was very destructive, tearing down anything and everything in its path, leaving behind ruins and rubble.

You may be wondering, “Has Texas seen anything this intense before?” “Were they ready?” The answer is, absolutely. You may remember that earlier on in the semester, our class spent a great deal of time studying about Hurricane Galveston, that took place many years prior to Hurricane Ike that took place in 2008. The two hurricanes are strikingly similar, both came moving into the area of Galveston Texas at about 12 MPH, although Galveston had stronger winds.

The area of Galveston, TX is very susceptible to a hurricane due to the fact that it is close to the shoreline. Studies have showed that if Hurricane Ike had hit just 50 miles down the Texas coast, the impact would have been four times as worse physically and economically. Galveston itself is located pretty much on the cast of Texas, making this disaster one that was pretty tough to escape. Since the hurricane only touched down twice before hitting Texas, it was unsure of where the hurricane was headed next. Satellites were used to track Ike since it was not close enough to the ground to be tracked.

The crews that came to the aid of Galveston and other surrounding areas knew what they were doing, as they could get the city back on its feet in a short amount of time. The ruins made a mark on the city financially, but progressed well and is doing great to this day.

CASE STUDY SUMMARY, CONRAD’aquila+map&imgrc=9BV3Z1KBqWN5kM:&spf=436

The natural disaster that I chose to cover was the L’Aquila earthquake which struck Italy on April 6, 2009. L’Aquila is the capital of Abruzzo, Italy, which is how the earthquake got its name. I chose to do this case study, because one of my old friends lived in not far from Rome, Italy, and she had explained to me that her town still experiences the aftershocks that resulted from the earthquake. The actual earthquake itself has nothing that seriously stood out. The earthquake hit the city around 3:30 AM with a recorded magnitude of 6.3. The death rate was recorded to be around 290-309 individuals. L’Aquila is set on what is a normal fault that has caused numerous earthquakes in the same region from 1530-1958. The earthquake which struck Italy in February of 1703, caused damage to much of L’Aquila and had a death toll of around 5,000 people. The response to the disaster is very much linked to the past rather than the present recorded prior to the earthquake of 2009 Sometimes, before an earthquake strikes, individuals will see what is referred to as “luminary phenomena.” While it has been the topic of much debate in the past, in the case of the L’Aquila earthquake, these lights are said to have given the people a warning before the earthquake struck the city. Along with this warning sign, it was the research of inventor Another indication of the earthquake that would hit L’Aquila was the predictions that were issued by Giampaolo Giuliani.

Giuliani as a respected member of the L’Aquila community and conducted research in the predictive quality of radon gas levels and earthquakes. Giuliani had first been introduced to the topic of radon gas by the Russians in 1999. According to past research by measuring the amount of radon gas, the Russians had been able to better forecast the earthquake that would hit Tukey later that year. In 2003, Giuliani submitted a proposal to the National Institute of Geophysics and Vulcanology for project funding to study radon gas emissions as a possible predictor for earthquakes, using one or more radometers that he himself had designed. Although Giuliani could meet with both Bosci and Guido Bertolaso, the head of the government’s interior ministry, both men rejected Giuliani’s request for funding because neither of them believed that Giuliani’s idea had enough scientific evidence to be utilized as a predictor for future earthquakes. The rejections of his request for funding was based on previous faulty data that had not been updated. Many other countries besides Russia had attempted to build their own radometers, none of which were truly successful. Nonetheless, Giuliani persisted and built two of his own radometers in 2006, and as it so happened, his invention would help to predict the earthquake that would hit L’Aquila in December of 2008.

Giuliani noticed a series of small tremors in early December, but they were not strong enough for people to become alarmed. Following the tremors, on March 27, 2009, Giuliani was worried that another quake would strike. Giuliani set up a radometer in the basement of an old school, and warned that a quake would come within the next day. The following morning, a quake was recorded with a magnitude of 2.3. Panic started to vibrate throughout Italy when Giuliani predicted a quake of a higher magnitude headed toward the city of Sulmona, which was only 50km from L’Aquila. Finally, Giuliani’s warning was taken seriously and the minister was warned which caused panic throughout the city, and officials placed a gag injunction on Giuliani on March 30, which prevented Giuliani from trying to warn the public of upcoming disasters until the injunction was lifted. The next day, following Giuliani’s predictions, an earthquake with a magnitude of 4.2 hit L’Aquila. If that’s not the biggest, “I told you so,” I don’t know what is. Although Giuliani had given evidence that would prove L’Aquila was set up for disaster, the panic of the public caused Giuliani to be dismissed by the Italian government. This gave people a false sense of security. Because the Italian government did not seriously take Giuliani’s warnings- even banned, the people did not have the right information to prepare for the earthquake. After the struggles that Giuliani faced, there was also some ethical issues that came into light. Following the recovery from earthquake, six scientists who were involved in warning the public, were sentenced to jail on counts of manslaughter. Stefano Gresta, president of Italy’s National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology in Rome, stated that the verdicts were so harsh because the men tried to downplay the severity of the impending earthquake. Furthermore, it was stated that two of the men involved, only tried to calm the public, not present the facts on the prediction of the event.

The mortality in the L’Aquila earthquake is slightly complicated. The time has a lot to do with this, as I have mentioned, the earthquake hit L’Aquila around 3:30 AM, this meant that most people were still sleeping. There is a good and bad side to this. On the one hand, because people were sleeping, it meant that falling objects could not hit them, nor would masses of people be injured at the same time. However, because the earthquake did happen at such an early hour, this meant that individuals had a much slower reaction time which did result in more harm. twice as many women died than men in the L’Aquila earthquake. Another contributing factor to mortality in the L’Aquila earthquake was the location of those who lived in the city of L’Aquila. Many of those who died or were injured in earthqake got hurt because debris from falling buildings fell on them. L’Aquila is only about an hour away from Rome and this allowed for response to be carried out quickly. Response from Italian officials was also issued quickly because the main hospital in L’Aquila had been gravely damaged during the earthquake. Coppito, located just outside of the city was the country’s training place for the police in the city. This meant that aid could be given to the city right away because of the ready police force. Furthermore, the police compound provided some resident units which meant that those who had lost their homes in the earthquake had a place to stay. Volunteer organizations, such as the Italian Red Cross, and the armed forces also set up base there, which took over as the main care facility in which emergencies were handled in the following months. Evacuation quickly followed the disaster, including the entire historic center of L’Aquila. Over 171 tent camps were created and overseen by the Italian military.

According to an article that was published by the BBC, the EU gave L’Aquila sixty-six million dollars in aid, however, recent findings have discovered that this money was misused.  Soren Bo Sondergaad, a reporter for the European Parliament, found evidence which suggested that the money that was given by the EU, was handed to various individuals who had been proven to have taken part in organized crime. Sondergaad also suggested that what reconstruction had been done to the city was unsafe. Along with working to help those who lost their homes because of the earthquake, it is also important to discuss the recovery of the city. It was found that much of the repairs that were done throughout L’Aquila were solely funded through the Italian government Much of the money put into fixing the structures went towards bricks because most of the buildings in L’Aquila are old. Although much of the city was asked to evacuate as a part of earthquake management, the people of L’Aquila state that much of their city remains in ruins more than five years after the earthquake. Today, there are still 632 buildings that are reported to have been destroyed because of the earthquake. The President has stated that his mind is set on fully repairing the town; however, money is a large obstacle. Since March, it has been reported that the government has spent an estimated 4.4 billion on repairs.



I chose this case study mainly because I was in shock with how many tornadoes occurred during such a short amount of time, and wanted to know more about the disaster.

The  Oklahoma/Kansas disaster, also known as The Great Plains tornado, occurred on May 3, 1999. It was an outbreak that started in the late afternoon and early evening hours that was due to various supercell thunderstorms that had composed many large and destructive tornadoes. The total count of damaging tornadoes that took place in the southern central part of Kansas, Oklahoma, and a little bit of northern Texas, is a heart-wrenching seventy.Two of which were dangerous, long-lived F4 and F5 tornadoes ,on the Fujita Scale, that passed near Wichita, Kansas and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.  This destructive hazard was a 68 mile long path that crossed several Interstate highways and devastated several suburban areas.

The strongest tornado, F5, hit the city of Amber, Oklahoma, at around 7 p.m, and moved to other cities in Oklahoma, and had especially devastated the town of Moore.

The Plains region is common for tornadoes. Oklahoma and Kansas, climatologically, experiences high frequency of tornadoes, especially in the spring each year, mainly because of the clashing of air masses.  There could have been more mitigation or preparation that could have been planned, yet t the mitigation that was in place worked for the most part as there was not as much fatalities had it not been in place. Most of the population knew what do in the event of a tornado, since they were subjected to many.

A total of forty people in Oklahoma and about 675 people were injured.

For the first time, there was a survey about tornado events by a Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT), created by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), due to the fact  that the intensity and extent of the damage was so high that it  warranted the creation of FEMA’s first ever tornado BPAT ( BAPT,1999).

The public facilities were worse off in mitigation and preparation compared to the residences. It was decided that for the restoration process, that the public facilities  of Oklahoma and Kansas be better prepared for any future disaster that will come their way.

Long story short, this was one of the worse outbreaks that the Great Plains had ever had  to deal with. It created havoc and heartache among many. That tornado produced roughly 100 times more damage than any other tornado on record in Oklahoma City.  It was the costliest and the deadliest.

Case Study Summary_ Chambers

I chose this case study on the 1970 Bhola Cyclone, because it was one of the first natural disasters to capture my attention. It is also one of the biggest natural disasters to occur in world history.

The storm originated in early November by a tropical storm that had moved across the western part of Malaysia. After a while the tropical storm had reached the Bay of the Bengal, where the water is famous for how warm it is. During this time that the storm has reached the Bay the storm had begun to build greatly. The time that the storm began to intensify is recorded to have begun on the eighth of November. By the ninth of November reports stated that the storm had reached its tropical storm potential. At precisely high tide the storm had arrived at the Ganges on the early morning of November 13th. As the storm was heading northward towards East Pakistan the storm was beginning to build very quickly and fast. Before the storm could reach its full potential, the satellites were able to get a close approximation as to what the average wind would be at landfall and the wind gust. The average wind fall at landfall was expected to be at 140 miles per hour. At the time of high tide the storm surge had reached twelve feet. With the storm surge being at twelve feet that was additional ten feet to the measurement of the sea level already. As a result of all the storm surges this caused the storm surge to reach a total of twenty feet. (Emanuel, 2005, pp. 221-25)

The reconstruction phase consisted of rebuilding almost everything because the storm destroyed everything, including buildings, homes, and agriculture. Since Bangladesh is subjected to receiving these natural disasters frequently they are continually revamping their storm systems and shelters, so the reconstruction phase is forever continuing. Extensive amounts of mitigation was started after the storm took place in Bangladesh and they invested in preventable infrastructure and embankments. Besides their indestructible infrastructure and their steps to better mitigate the area, they have taken other precautions too. They have built better cyclone shelters and made evacuation routes so people have ways to escape before the storm can worsen. They have invested their time in bettering their communication systems and have developed credible warning systems along with investments in extraordinary and user friendly relief systems. For the future, they have used all of these preparation tactics, since cyclones are common in Bangladesh. Along with the other preparation systems they have gotten involved with the national Cyclone Preparedness Programee (CPP) and that has helped them to improve and reduce the amount of destruction that occurs during and after a storm strikes. (, 2017)


This is a map before the war started.

This is a map after the war started.

Case Study Summary Hogan

In November of 1984, the Nevado Ruiz started experiencing regular tremors. Over the next 51 weeks, the volcano continued to show signs of eruption, until finally erupting on November 13,1981. It would become one of the most devastating eruptions in living memory, causing over 23,000 deaths and costing almost a quarter of the Columbian GDP. Unsurprisingly, the main threats of the disaster were mudslides caused by mass ice-melt on the glacier of the volcano. The mud-slides would mainly threaten the town of Armero, 75 km east of the Nevado Ruiz.

Almost every single person involved handled the situation incorrectly. The town itself was built on a plane made by the previous eruption of the Nevado Ruiz. There was even a detailed history of the mudslide that formed the plane, explaining when, where, and how it formed. The village failed to do their due diligence on volcanic history, as did the Columbian geology institution, and the UN disaster commission. However, the USGS published a map of possible mud slide zones, and distributed it to the people of Armero. However, they did not educate people properly, there was no practice evacuation or education on evacuation routes. The mayor in the town did not think the disaster was a big deal, and was telling the national news network over HAM radio that he did not think the mudslide was a big threat as he was swept away and killed. For whatever reason, the police did not have a HAM radio, and were incommunicado when the volcano erupted at 9 pm, and did not evacuate the town in the two hours until the mudslides reached Armero. Almost every single building was destroyed, and 23 thousand people died before 1 AM, in a town of 24,000.

There is not a single mitigation method in the world that would prevent a mudslide of the magnitude that hit Armero, the only things that would help would be to move the town three hundred feet vertically, or away from the mudslide threat zones. Evacuation plans, and power independent siren systems would have gone a long way towards helping people evacuate, HOWEVER THE EVACUATION ORDER WAS NOT GIVEN, BECAUSE NOBODY PICKED UP THE PHONE OR RADIO. So sorting out the chain of command would go a long way towards resolving disasters.

On November 14, the day after the eruption, a crop duster flew over Armero to survey the damage. They almost did not find it, however there was a single culvert of trees with intact buildings. It then called the local dispatch, and the military was sent in. This was nine hours after the initial eruption, and five hours after the mudslides had subsided in Armero. Rescue operations had to be carried out purely by helicopter, which limited the scope that rescue operations could take place.


Case Study Summary_King

Hurricane Isabel occured over a two week period in September of 2003. The Tropical Depression that would later turn into Isabel started in the Atlantic Ocean. It made landfall in North Carolina and ripped through Virginia, West Virginia, and made its way into Canada. Funding for restoration topped $500,000 at the time and many federal organizations were involved for reconstruction. The most vulnerable residents were those that were trapped with no way to evacuate due to rising water. The beach tourist population became stranded without a way to safely leave, but they were also not allowed to enjoy the beach for two weeks following the Storm. The public were prepared with multiple call centers available ahead of time so that prevention of negligence could occur while families were stuck in their houses. This hurricane was fascinating to me because I lived in Northern Virginia at the time, where we were out of grade school for a few days to deal with the damage to my town. This was the first major weather hazard that I recall as a kindergarten student and I remember that the tree I loved to climb fell into our deck.

Boswick Case Study Summary: Cyclone Bhola

Upon rapidly moving northeast over the Bay of Bengal, Cyclone Bhola slammed into East Pakistan (modern day Bangladesh) on the evening of November 12th, 1970, with the strength equivalency of a category three hurricane. The power of this cyclone, combined with an abnormally high lunar tide, created a storm surge higher than 5 meters that ravaged the nation’s low-lying coastal region that only averaged 2-8 meters above sea level in elevation.  Economic damages are estimated at 86.4 million United States dollars (over $500 million today after inflation markup); additionally, conservative death tolls report approximately 300,000 lives lost.  The fishing sector of the economy was hit particularly hard.  Analysis after the storm revealed that 46,000 fishermen out of the estimated 77,000 routinely operating in the coastal region were killed while roughly 65 percent of the region’s total annual fishing capacity was destroyed.  Cyclone Bhola dissipated the following day on November 13th, 1970.  The high loss of life is attributed to a severe lack of public awareness that resulted from governing officials not placing an emphasis on disaster mitigation and preparation.  Nine years prior to Bhola, the director of the United States Weather Bureau’s Hurricane Warning Center even authored a thoroughly comprehensive mitigation plan for the region, but it was largely overlooked.  

Below is footage compiled in the disaster zone after the cyclone had dissipated.  It highlights the mundanity of the initial relief effort and shows how survivors lived in the months after Bhola. 

Case Study Summary_McPhail

I wrote my case study on the Newcastle-Bridge Creek-Moore Tornado: An EF5, 3/4 mile wide, violent storm which devastated Oklahoma City and its surrounding counties. It claimed 36 lives, injured 583, damaged 2,500 houses, and completely destroyed another 1,800. In total, it caused the equivalent of $1.1 billion in loss, making it the fifth costliest tornado in history. Additionally, Doppler on Wheels radar allowed for the highest wind speeds ever recorded globally to be measured during this tornado at 301 mph. The 1999 Moore Tornado belonged to the Great Plains Tornado Outbreak, which in itself was a collection of massive super cell storms which in total spawned 74 tornadoes in a 21 hour time period. Additionally, Moore was also the central victim to an EF3-4 tornado in 2003, and another EF5 in 2013, which I touched on in my paper in order to compare and contrast mitigation and how the community itself remains resilient.

Simply put, the mother storm which produced the Moore tornado was the result of humid air, very high atmospheric instability, and strong wind shear. Beginning just after 6:00 AM, a “slight risk” warning for severe weather was published by the Norman forecasting station, fewer than 10 miles from Moore. Over the next 9 hours, 116 bulletins/announcements from various stations gradually upgraded the warning from slight risk, to moderate risk, to high risk, to, finally, a tornado warning. The tornado touched down in Central Grady County. Generally, it rampaged from Amber, to northern Newcastle, to the southern sections of Oklahoma City, to Moore, through Oklahoma City once again, to Del City, and, finally, into Midwest City. Two smaller, satellite tornadoes also rotated around the main one, adding to the damage. The tornado was on the ground for an astonishing 1 hour, 26 minutes before dissipating.

Oklahomans were no strangers to tornados,  including a few of high caliber. NOAA had also recently undergone a technological upheaval, which modernized stations and equipped meteorologists with new technologies to aid in forecasting/monitoring these storms. Clearly, a small city perfectly situated in the middle of Tornado Alley knew something about its risk, and post-disaster interviews described how the city felt a false sense of security for a few reasons. First, it had prepared with safety drills and public education. Second, the majority of the public felt “tornado apathy,” meaning that many tornado watches and warnings had been issued in the past, and very few of them actually produced any tornado at all. Additionally, a few citizens had private storm shelters. Many residents of Moore had experienced EF0/EF1/EF2 tornados in their lifetimes, and could not comprehend the level of destruction this one event would cause. These factors, more than demographic statistics, influenced Moore’s vulnerability. One particular story described a family who sought shelter in an inner hallway to their home. The only walls left standing after the tornado had passed were those encasing them. Additionally, among the 36 deaths, several of them were children in an elementary school without storm shelters, sparking later debate and policy about how to best protect kids at school in the event of severe weather. Furthermore, many others who sought ill-advised shelter beneath the surrounding interstates were crushed.

The damage path stretched 1,300 feet wide. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Moore received local, state, and federal workers, volunteers, and aid. Emergency shelters originally housed 1,600, and mobile food and donation centers helped sustain those who had lost everything. Main support systems in the emergency phase were FEMA and the state’s National Guard. It took until the beginning of June for volunteers to clear 58% of the debris left behind. Moore’s residents, for the most part, remained there in temporary housing during the rebuilding process.

Lastly, the tornado highlighted the need for better alert systems, more storm shelters, stronger building codes, and a change in the way the public perceived their risk in the face of a powerful tornado. With the backing of state government, 6,016 storm shelters and 20+ new warning towers had been built just in time for another EF3-4 tornado in 2003. As a result of these mitigation efforts, no fatalities occurred. However, in 2013, another EF5 tornado struck and followed a remarkably similar path to its 1999 sibling. This tornado claimed the lives of 24 people, and resulted in yet more infrastructure review–mostly centered on a large portion of Moore that had been rebuilt below minimal building standards. Overall, this case study highlights that tornado-proofing is virtually impossible due to financial and structural limitations. However, tornado resiliency can be achieved through the right incentives and interventions.

Pictures of the tornado and wreckage below (Sources: and




I did my case study on the 2005 La Conchita Landslide in California. In 2005 a landslide with over 400,000 tons of mud destroyed over 20 houses and killed ten people. Before this event happened there were fifteen days of huge amounts of rain. Due to this and the remobilization of the 1995 landslide, that also was caused because of the rain, the 2005 landslide was triggered and caused a lot of damage. The interesting thing is that the people were quite aware that there was a huge possibility that there would be another landslide before the one in 2005. Also there have been many landslides and mudslides over the past thousand years. In fact after the 1995 landslide happened, residents had to sign a waiver acknowledging that they know of the risk that comes with living there.

Although some of the residents moved after this event, many stayed. This is a small rural. community in the middle of the highway and the bluff (hill) that is right above the community. About 300 people live there and generations upon generations have lived there for many years. There are a couple of reasons the residents stayed. One was because of their socioeconomic status. This community is poorer than most. On top of that the properties decreased in price after the 1995 landslide so the people cannot afford to leave. However, the majority stay just because they are stubborn and refuse to move. Since their families have lived there forever, they do not want to leave even if it means risking their lives.

The recovery process was ineffective. Even though the emergency personnel advised the people to evacuate, they resisted and stayed. The county even asked for help from  Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue at the University of South Florida to bring in robots to help with finding the people buried under the tons of mud. However, the robots failed miserably and were sent back to Florida. In addition to this, the recovery plan that was proposed estimated $150,000,000. The county could not afford that and had to fundraise money. However, the plan to stabilize the hill was never carried out and instead a few barriers, a drainage system, and a wall to prevent small amounts of land erosion sliding down the hill was installed. This only helps with minor hazards. If there is ever a landslide, and geologists predict there will be, it will crush the houses and destroy their property once again.

The people in their own ways have tried to prepare themselves for the aftermath of another possible landslide after the 2005 one by keeping a storage shed filled with emergency supplies such as generators, radios, lights, sleeping bags, etc. They decided that if another landslide hits and crushes everything then they will just start from scratch and start all over again. The county even bought a tractor to remove dirt off the roads if need be. The people consider themselves “prepared” any future landslides because they now know to call 911, evacuate and honk their horns when the disaster hits to let others know of it.

It is amazing to think that people will rather risk their lives by staying in an extremely hazardous place then considering evacuating if possible.

Image result for la conchita,_California



My case study is on the El Mayor-Cucapah earthquake in Northern Mexico and Southern California.
The earthquake itself was a 7.2 magnitude earthquake that struck Easter Sunday at 4:30pm along the Laguna Salada fault line. It shook for 45 seconds and although there was minimal damage, three people were killed by collapsing walls. The earthquake was felt by 20 million people, as far as Phoenix, Los Vegas, Los Angeles and San Diego, but because the most energy spread to unpopulated areas of the desert and Mexico has a pretty good earthquake building code, which is strictly enforced, the death toll and damage overall was low (Wright and Murray). There were some events caused by El Mayor-Cucapah that were hazardous. For example, “tsunami waves” were formed in backyard swimming pools (Wright and Murray 2010). Since this hazard happened in Mexico, near Southern California along the Mexican border, most people were presumably at least mildly aware of earthquakes, especially because when people move to California, they get a packet on the risks of living in an earthquake-prone area. Major earthquakes have happened all the time in California, but the last earthquake to happen in Baja California, Mexico was in 1892 (Significant Earthquakes and Faults, 2013). More serious damage occurred in downtown Calexico, California, along the Mexican border. 80% of the buildings here were red-tagged, meaning that no one was allowed inside. Also, there was a high possibility that the aftershocks could bring the buildings down (Wright and Murray 2010). Individuals might not have been well-prepared, either. For example, Carlton Hargrave, a restaurant owner who lives in a California border town, said in an interview, “We’ve got tables overturned, plates broken on the floor, the ceilings caved in” and his restaurant “was almost completely destroyed” (Steinhauer, 2010). If an individual lives in a place prone to earthquakes, bolting furniture to the floor is a smart way to mitigate, so perhaps that might have helped Mr. Hargrave. In terms of planned preparation or mitigation, Mexico City’s Civil Protection Department took responsibility to protect its citizens after a 1985 earthquake struck. Since then, the city regularly has earthquake drills (Phillips and Starr, 2010). Some highlights of the preparation include that “Mexico City implemented advanced visualization technology to improve GIS information sharing between decision makers” and that GIS facilitated separate groups to see, interact with, and share the exact same data from different locations” (Phillips and Starr, 2010). It seems that there is not a significant poverty problem and although Mexico is known for some dangerous cities, Baja California does not make the top 50 list of Most Dangerous Cities in the World (Most Dangerous Cities in the World, 2016). That gives us some insight as to how vulnerable the population is. According to Staff, there is a significant portion of immigrants to this region. People from other Latin American countries come to Baja California for economic opportunities and to escape dangers in their own countries. The upside to this is that some Central American countries, such as El Salvador, have earthquakes, so they know the drill. Another reason immigration does not have such a big impact for earthquake safety here is because the immigrants mostly speak Spanish, so warnings and safety procedures can be understood easily. In California, the earthquake affected water and wastewater treatment systems. This was especially inconvenient with summer approaching (Meneses, 2010). In order to avoid dealing with the aftermath and damage, many Mexicans fled to the United States at the border at Calexico, California; however, people from California who experienced the earthquake were trying to go to Mexico to check on their relatives and due to the high volume of people trying to move in and out of the United States, part of the border ended up being closed (Page, Parcher, and Stefanov). In terms of rescuing, “rescue teams with dogs and digging equipment were rushing to Mexicali from nearby Tijuana, but a landslide along that highway was slowing traffic” (Hall and Baker, 2010). Restoring everything was much easier for the people in California than for the people in Mexico. There was damage to both places, but according to Hall and Baker, “the quake’s impact in San Diego was fleeting.” A year after the earthquake, reconstruction was still underway. Crook and Cavanaugh share that El Mayor-Cucapah had left about 25,000 people homeless in Mexicali and some of these people are still living in tents because they have nowhere to go. Reconstruction focused on replacing what was lost, but this did not please all of the residents. For example, the houses built by the government in Mexico were not received well by all residents- “people were talking about that they were gonna have to give up the title to their land, their family land, in the valley” (Crook and Cavanaugh, 2011). That problem, along with the homes being very small and far away, were seen as a problem. Not everyone has learned from the damage of this earthquake. People in Mexicali are still living in tagged homes, meaning that the homes are not secure places to be living. The earthquake has changed how scientists look at faults. El Mayor-Cucapah jumped seven miles in the fault zone, which is twice the distance of any jump scientists had seen before. It did not occur where scientists expected it to occur (Robbins, 2016).